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ABSTRACT 
Bayesian-style conditioning of an exact probability distribution can be done incremen- 
tally by updating the current distribution each time a new item of evidence is obtained. 
Many have suggested the use of lower and upper probabilities for representing bounds 
on probability distributions, which naturally suggests an analogous procedure of incre- 
mental conditioning using forms of interval arithemetic. Unfortunately, conditioning of 
lower and upper probability bounds loses information, yielding incorrect bounds when 
updates and performed incrementally and making the conditioning operation oncom- 
mutative. Furthermore, when lower probability functions are represented by way of their 
M6bius transforms, the operation of conditioning can cause an exponential explosion in 
the number of nonzero M6bius assignments used to represent the function. This paper 
presents an alternative representation for lower probability that overcomes these prob- 
lems. By representing the results of both Dempster conditioning and strong conditioning, 
the representation i directly encodes lower probability bounds in a form that allows 
updates to be performed incrementally without a loss of information. Conditioning with 
the new representation does not depend on the order of updates or on whether evidence 
is incorporated incremental(y or all at once. The bounds obtained are exact when the 
original lower probabilities atisfy a property called 2-monotonicity. Although the new 
representation encodes more information about probability bounds than the straight 
representation, updates on the new representation never increase the number of M6bius 
assignments used to encode the lower probability--a considerable improvement over 
the worst-case xponential increase seen with the straight representation. The new 
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representation helps to improve the efficiency and convenience of representing and 
manipulating lower probabilities. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Bayesian probabilistic framework provides a methodology for rea- 
soning about uncertainty [31, 16, 21, 36]. Belief is represented by a single 
probability distribution, and conditioning serves as the primary tool for 
updating belief as new information is obtained. An important characteris- 
tic of the updating process is that it can be done incrementally. In other 
words, each time a new fact is learned about the current situation, the 
probability distribution representing belief can be replaced by an updated 
distribution without any loss of information about the true situation. 1 
The use of a single exact probability distribution in the pure Bayesian 
framework is often challenged. Some feel that an exact distribution fails to 
satisfactorily distinguish between uncertainty and ignorance or between 
certainty and confidence [51, 26, 28, 27, 30, 61, 56, 39, 11, 40, 55, 53]. 
Others point out that often insufficient knowledge is available or that it is 
too time-consuming to obtain the necessary knowledge to warrant the 
precision inherent in exact probabilities [17, 52, 54, 11, 2, 33, 29, 14]. In 
response to these objections and others, many researchers have suggested 
replacing the use of an exact probability distribution with probability 
intervals, where the intervals are specified by lower and upper bounds. 
Lower and upper probability bounds have also been found useful in a 
traditional Bayesian framework for approximate computation [8], and to 
achieve a greater level of robustness [60; 22, Chapter 10]. 
Lower probabilities can be used to represent probability bounds [41, 18, 
12, 59, 5, 38, 14]. Let ~ denote a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
situations. A lower probability _P is a function _P:2 ~ ~ [0, 1] (satisfying 
certain conditions to be discussed in Section 2) that represents lower-bound 
constraints on probability distributions. A probability distribution P is 
consistent with _P if for every A <_<_ ~, P (A)  < P(A).  Thus _P can be 
viewed as representing a set of probability distributions--namely, those 
that are consistent with it. Probability distributions, belief functions 2 [41, 
1See, for example, Proposition 3.1 in [20]. 
2While belief functions are mathematically instances of lower probability functions, they are 
often used in a manner inconsistent with a lower-probabilistic interpretation. Both [41] and 
[20] discuss how belief functions may have either an evidential interpretation, as in the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [40, 42] and the transferable-belief model [50, 49], or a 
lower-probabilistic interpretation. 
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26, 15], lower envelope [57, 34], inner and outer measures [15], and 
probability bounds on individual elements of 12 [17, 56] are all special 
cases of lower probabilities. 
Using a lower-probability representation, it is natural to attempt infer- 
ence in an analogous manner to Bayesian inference. Beginning with a 
lower-probability function, one would incrementally update this function 
as new evidence arrives. But unlike the case with exact probabilities, a
lower-probability representation alone is not sufficient for capturing all the 
information about the current situation that is available at the time of 
update. In other words, each lower-probability update loses information, 
so that bounds obtained after two or more successive updates may disagree 
with the bounds that would be obtained by conditioning the original belief 
in a single step with all available evidence [37]. In fact, in general the 
bounds obtained will depend upon the order in which updates are per- 
formed [20]. This loss of information is not a result of any particular 
conditioning rule, but is a result of the fact that the representation of
lower probability is not powerful enough to capture all the information 
that is available at the time of an update [24]. 
In addition to the loss of information, a second problem can impede the 
use of lower-probability intervals. In practical applications, one is often 
interested in "sparse" lower-probability functions--representations where 
probability bounds can be described with a small number of mass assign- 
ments. This is because in the general (nonsparse) case, the number of 
parameters in a lower-probability specification can be enormous. For 
example, if N = I f~l is finite, as many as 2 N numbers may be required. To 
take advantage of sparsity, one can represent the M/Sbius transform of a 
lower-probability function inside a computer ather than explicitly storing 
the function itself [42]. In M6bius space, each nonzero set assignment can 
be viewed as one constraint, and a lower-probability function is sparse 
when the overwhelming majority of M6bius set assignments are zero. A 
problem with the use of standard lower-probability representations is that 
the conditioning of these representations does not preserve sparsity. After 
an update, the number of mass assignments necessary to represent he 
function can grow considerably--increasing exponentially in some cases. 
This paper introduces an alternative representation and method for 
conditioning lower-probability functions that addresses the above two 
difficulties. It allows for incremental updating of lower probabilities with- 
out a loss of information, and when a sparse function is updated, the result 
remains sparse. Furthermore, it is convenient to perform the update in 
M6bius space. 
Much of the existing literature concerning lower and upper probability 
centers around the Dempster-Shafer theory [40]. Many have attempted 
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to relate the theory to probability theory and/or lower-probability inter- 
pretations 3 [19, 26, 28]. In this context, an interesting aspect of the repre- 
sentation introduced here is a relationship that is highlighted between 
Dempster's rule of conditioning and lower-probabilistic conditioning (or 
convex conditioning). In particular, it is found that Dempster's rule of 
conditioning indirectly captures part (more than half, but not all) of the 
information ecessary to maintain lower- and upper-probability intervals. 
Section 2 reviews background, terminology, and known results concern- 
ing lower probability. Section 3 demonstrates with an example the loss of 
information that results when a straight lower-probability representation is 
updated incrementally. A solution is presented in Section 4, where a new 
representation for lower-probability information is introduced, and its 
representation i terms of the M6bius transform is given in Section 5, 
followed by an example in Section 6 to demonstrate how the new represen- 
tation is used. In Section 7 the complexity of updates is examined, where it 
is shown that the straight lower-probability representation does not take 
advantage of sparsity, while the new representation does. We conclude in 
Section 8. 
2. LOWER PROBABILITY 
We begin in this section by reviewing terminology and known results 
concerning lower probability. Many similar properties and terminology 
have been developed and utilized by [6; 41; 22, Chapter 10; 58; 59; 35; 5; 
34; 24] and others. 
Every probabilistic argument begins with a mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive set of possible situations, denoted by f~ and termed a frame of 
discernment. A probability distribution on 12 is an additive set function 
P : 2 a ~ [0, 1] with P(Q) = 0 and P(Iq) = 1. It is additive in that for any 
A, B ___12 with A AB=Q 
P(A U B) = P(A)  + P(B).  
We denote the set of all probability distributions on 12 by ~t'. 
Lower- and upper-probability functions, _P and P, are also set functions 
on f~, satisfying the following properties for any A, B _ 12 with A ~ B = 
®: 
1. _p(®) = P (• )  = 0, 
2. _P(12) = P(12)  = 1, 
3. _P(A) + P(A) = 1, 
3Some work has also strived to remove any relation whatsoever to a probabilistic interpreta- 
tion (e.g., [50, 48]). 
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4. _P(A) + _P(B) < _P(A t3 B) (superadditivity), 
5. f i(A) + P(B) >_ P(A u B) (subadditivity), 
where .4denotes l-I -A ,  the complement of A. 
Property 3 above specifies that _P and fi are mutual conjugates, and 
therefore it is only necessary to store one of the other, since either can be 
readily obtained from the other. It is always the case that _P(A) < fi(A). 
We say a probability distribution P is consistent with a lower probability 
_P (and implicitly its conjugate fi) when for every A c_ f~, _P(A) < P(A). 
We denote by ~(P)  the set of all distributions consistent with _P. The 
above conditions that define lower probabilities are not strong enough to 
ensure that ~(_P) ¢ O. 
Suppose there exists a nonempty ~ ___t/such that for all A _ f~ 
_P(A) = inf P(A) ,  
P~ 
P(A) = sup P(A). 
P~ 
Then _P is called a lower enuelope and fi is its conjugate, called an upper 
enuelope. Every lower envelope is also a lower probability, but the converse 
does not hold. 
Every lower-probability function is monotone (sometimes called 1-mono- 
tone), meaning that 
A c_B ~ P(A)  <-_P(B). 
A stronger property called 2-monotoncity is often useful [6]. A lower 
probability _P on f~ is 2-monotone when for every A, B _c 1~, 
P (A)  +_P(B) _<_P(A N B) +_P(A U B). 
Two-monotonicity is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition to ensure 
that _P is a lower envelope. Also, it can be shown [59] that _P is 2-mono- 
tone if and only if for every A, B _c l-l, A • B = 0,  there exists P ~ g(_P) 
such that 
P(A)  =i f (A)  and P(B)=P(B) .  (1) 
The extra property of 2-monotonicity is often quite useful, particularly 
because it is often the weakest condition necessary for obtaining simple 
but exact closed-form formulas for various inferences. It is the strongest 
property we will utilize for the results in this paper. 
For the remainder of this paper, we will only consider finite frames of 
discernment (i.e., FI)I < ~). Suppose 1~ is a finite frame of discernment, 
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and _P is a lower-probability function defined on ~. The Mfbius transform 
of _P is the set function m : 2 a ~9~ defined by [40, p. 39] 
re(A) = ~_~ (--1)IA-BIp_ (B).  (2) 
Bc_A 
If re(A) >__ 0 for all A ___ ~, then P is called a belief unction, and readers 
familiar with Dempster-Shafer theory will recognize m as the mass assign- 
ment function; however, it is not required for _P to be a belief function for 
the M/Sbius transform to be defined, and in general, m(.) may be negative 
on some sets. Belief functions are equivalent to what Choquet [6] termed 
o~-monotone capacities [55]. Every belief function is also 2-monotone, and 
therefore is a lower envelope, and therefore is a lower probability, but 
2-monotone lower envelopes are not, in general, belief functions. 
The sets with nonzero M6bius assignments are termed the focal ele- 
ments of P. 
The M6bius transform is information-preserving, in that the original 
function _P can be recovered from m using the inverse M6bius transform 
given by 
_P(A) = ~ re(B). (3) 
Bc_A 
The original proof of this inverse relationship was given in [40, Theorem 
2.2] in the context of belief functions, but his proof did not rely on the 
nonnegativity of m(.), so it holds for more general lower-probability 
functions as well. The same proof is rewritten in terms of the more general 
case in [5, Appendix] (see also [25]). The upper probability function is also 
readily available form the M6bius transform using 
P(A)  = 1 -P ( . f f )  = ~ m(B)  (4) 
BgX 
We can interpret each nonzero MObius assignment as a constraint on 
the allowable probability distributions. A positive assignment, m(A)  = x, 
specifies that x units of probability mass is constrained to the set A, but 
within A may be redistributed arbitrarily. A negative mass assignment, 
m(A)  = -x ,  specifies that x units of probability antimass is constrained to 
the set A and can be redistributed onto the positive probability mass 
within A so as the cancel out an equivalent amount of positive probability 
mass. We can therefore view the number of focal elements as a measure of 
the number of constraints pecifying the bounds in a lower probability 
function. Other forms of constraints are also possible, but are not consid- 
ered in this paper. 
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The most general ower probability requires 2 N numbers (N = II)l) to 
specify either _P or its M6bius transform m. For any sizable domain, this is 
prohibitive; however, for many applications where lower probabilities 
might be of interest, the probability bounds arise from a relatively small 
number of mass assignments. It is therefore typically most convenient to 
represent m inside a computer, rather than _P, since only the nonzero 
assignments must be enumerated. When the number of focal elements is 
small, we say that _P is sparse. 
2.1 An Example 
We introduce a simple example here which will be used to demonstrate 
some of the basic ideas. The example is entirely hypothetical and is not 
intentionally based on any accepted paleontological fact. 
A group of paleontologists are beginning to hunt fossils in a previously 
unexplored but very unusual region of northwest Burkawaland (a fictitious 
place). The only fossils they expect to find are those of mammals, birds, 
reptiles, and fish, but because they know so little about the area and 
because the region is so unusual, they are uncomfortable with the idea of 
estimating an exact a priori distribution over fossil types. They choose 
instead to estimate a prior lower-probability function. 
The only previous study of the area stated that out of 100 fossils that 
had been examined, three were determined to be of mammalian origin, 
and 50 were clearly from fish. There were 46 specimens that were believed 
to be either a species of fish or reptile, but with the tools available at the 
time of the study, there was no way to determine which. Finally, there was 
one specimen that might have been either a bird or reptile, but again, that 
could not be determined. Based solely on this study, by accepting the 
proportions found in the study as being indicative of the population of 
fossils as a whole, the group adopts the lower-probability distribution 
whose M6bius transform is the following: 
1~ = {mammal, bird, reptile, fish}, 
mo({mammal}) = 0.03, 
mo({fish}) = 0.5, 
mo({reptile, fish}) = 0.46, 
(5) 
mo( { bird, reptile}) = 0.01, 
m0(all other sets) = 0. 
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This function specifies probability bounds--for example Po({bird, fish}) is 
bounded by -P0 ({bird, fish}) = 0.5, and F 0 ({bird, fish}) = 0.97. The exam- 
ple happens to be a belief function (and therefore also a 2-monotone lower 
envelope). 
3. INCREMENTAL CONDITIONING 
Conditioning is the primary mechanism for incorporating evidence within 
a Bayesian framework. In this framework, one begins with knowledge 
about uncertainty explicitly encoded in the form of an a priori probability 
distribution P0. After learning that E 1 c ~ is true, an updated belief, 
P1 : 2n ~ [0, 1], is obtained using 
P~(A) = Po(AIE1) 
Po(A A E 1) 
Po(E1) 
This is the definition of conditional probability. When a second item of 
evidence is obtained, E 2, the process repeats using the first updated belief 
as the starting point: 
P2(A) = PI(AIE2) = 
PI( A N E 2) 
PI(E2) 
[= Po(AIE1, E2)]. 
Conditional probability has the very important property that the same 
result is obtained independent of the order of updates and whether or not 
updates are performed incrementally. 
Consider the same incremental process tating with the lower probabil- 
ity function in (5) from the example of Section 2.1. Suppose a new fossil is 
discovered, and the team now wishes to determine its type (and associated 
uncertainty). First, a team member notes that the animal had legs, and 
therefore was not a fish (E 1 = {mammal, bird, reptile}). What does it mean 
to update the lower probability function? Ideally, the result should repre- 
sent the envelope obtained by collecting each probability distribution 
consistent with the original function after it has been updated with the 
new evidence. This desired envelope after learning E 1 = {mammal, bird, 
reptile} is given by the following (again, the M6bius transform is shown): 
ml({mammal}) = 0.06, 
ml({mammal, reptile}) = 0.69, (6) 
ml( { bird, reptile}) = 0.25. 
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Later it will be shown how such computations can be performed. The 
bounds given by this function are t ight-- for any set A ___ 12, one can find a 
probability distribution consistent with the initial belief that yields the 
bound after conditioning. For example, the bound P({mammal, reptile}) = 
0.75 is obtained from the distribution (0.03, 0.01, 0, 0.96). 
Suppose another test reveals that the specimen was definitely not that of 
a reptile, thus indicating that the classification is in E 2 = {mammal, bird, 
fish}. If (6) is updated, as one would do using incremental updating, the 
following M6bius function is obtained: 
m2({mammal}) = 0.19, 
(7) 
m2( {mammal, bird}) = 0.81. 
One would hope that by updating the original belief m 0 in one step with 
all the evidence learned thus far, E = E 1 f3 E z = {mammal, bird}, the 
same result would be obtained. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Updat- 
ing m 0 with {mammal, bird} yields 
m3({mammal}) = 0.75, 
(8) 
m3({mammal, bird}) = 0.25. 
Comparing (7) and (8) shows that they are actually quite a bit different 
[e.g., _P3({mammal})-_P2({mammal})= 0.56]. One might also consider 
what happens if we perform the updates in the opposite order, first 
conditioning on E 2 = {mammal, bird, fish} then on E 1 = {mammal, bird, 
reptile}. Doing so in this example yields yet another esult: 
m4({mammal}) = 0.62, 
m a( {mammal, bird}) = 0.38. 
The fact that all of these are different is very dissatisfying and is something 
that does not occur with exact probabilities. The problem was previously 
noted in [20] and [37], and similar problems for other forms of interval 
probabilities (e.g., Dempster-Shafer) have also been discussed in the 
literature [1]. 
The reason that incremental updating does not work is that the lower- 
probability representation is not sufficiently powerful to represent all the 
information that is available [24]. Each time an update is performed, some 
information is lost, and the information that is lost can be important for 
determining bounds for subsequent updates. In other words, some new 
consistent distributions are introduced which are not the result of the 
original set of consistent distributions. An analogy is useful for seeing how 
this is possible. Figure l(a), shows a set of points in the plane which is 








x ~ x x ~ x x 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 1 
X 
exactly represented by the indicated bounds. After a transformation is
applied to these points, the resulting bounds can again be perfectly 
represented, as shown in Figure l(b), even though the bounds do not 
capture the set of points exactly. After a second transformation, Figure 
l(c), the loss of information is reflected in the incrementally updated 
bounds. 
Overcoming the loss of information from incremental updates requires a 
more powerful representation. One such representation that has been 
studied by Cano [2], Tessem, [56] and others is a system of linear con- 
straints in the (N - 1)-dimensional simplex of probability vectors, where 
the linear constraints pecify a convex polytope with a finite number of 
sides. While such a representation does provide sufficient information to 
enable incremental updates, it is not as popular as lower-probability 
representations, primarily because it is much more tedious to use and 
because the number of parameters in such a representation can quickly 
become unmanageable, as discussed in [56]. Walley [58] has also intro- 
duced a more general representation, called lower previsions, which is 
equivalent o closed convex sets of probabilities [22, p. 256; 58, Section 
3.3]. 
4. A NEW REPRESENTATION 
This section presents a new representation that is quite convenient to 
use, and that captures all the information ecessary for obtaining correct 
bounds after incremental updating. When the starting lower probability 
function is 2-monotone, the bounds are guaranteed to be tight (i.e., the 
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bounds will be achieved for some initial consistent prior probability distri- 
bution). The following section examines its M6bius transform. 
Suppose _P is an initial lower-probability function. After learning E = 
E a n E 2 n .--, the desired updated function (whether it is computed 
incrementally or not) is 
_P(AIE) = inf{P(AIE) 'P ~(_P) ,  P(E) > 0}. (9) 
This form of conditioning has been referred to as convex conditioning [26] 
and as the cautious Bayesian [14] approach to conditioning. Of course, it 
would not be feasible to enumerate all consistent probability distributions 
and then perform the above inf operation, but it is easy to obtain a bound 
for _P(A]E). Recall the following rule of probability, where P is a probabil- 
ity distribution: 
P(A N E) 
P(AIE) = (10) 
P(A n E) + P(AA E) 
Since for every set B _c 1~, if(B)_< P(B)<_ fi(B) are lower and upper 
bounds on P, we can plug these bounds into (10) to obtain 
P(A n E) 
P(A IE )  > . (11) 
_P(A A E) + P (A  A E)  
Therefore, the right-hand side of (11) is a lower bound. The lower bound is 
undefined when fi(E) = 0 and requires a somewhat different reatment, 
considered later, when fi(E) > _P(E) = 0. Recall that when _P is 2-mono- 
tone, there exists a distribution P such that P(A n E) = _P(A n E) and 
P (AA E) = P(A n E), so that the bound is tight when _P is 2-monotone. 
This formula has been identified previously for the special case of belief 
functions in [10, Equation (4.8)], [58, p. 301], [38], [15], [60], [24], [49], and 
[9]. Additional properties for the belief-function case are given in [15] and 
[24]. As discussed in the previous ection, even when the bounds are tight, 
information may be lost. 
Other forms of conditioning are possible, although each returns some- 
thing different, so the results must be interpreted with caution. For 
example, Dempster [10] introduced the following conditioning rule: 
P(A n E) 
P(AII*E) (12) 
fi( E ) 
It is undefined when f i(E)= 0. The rule is called Dempster's rule of 
conditioning. The notation I1" is used here to distinguish this rule of 
conditioning from (11) and from other possible conditioning rules. The 
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interpretation of this rule has been considered in [40], [44], [42], and [50] 
and is often intuitively viewed as a measure of evidential support--the 
degree to which the evidence supports the hypotheses. However, we can 
see that Dempster's rule is not appropriate for directly describing lower 
probabilities as we desire, since, for example, the bounds produced by it 
are too narrow for our desired probabilistic interpretation [10]: 
_P(AIE) < _P(AII*E) _< P(AIE) < P(AII*E) _< P(AIE). (13) 
A dual to Dempster's conditioning rule is possible: 
_P(A ~ E) 
_P(AII,E) (14) 
i f (E)  
It is undefined when _P(E) = 0. This has been called strong conditioning 
[32, 13] and geometric onditioning [55, 23, 47, 46] and might be viewed as a 
measure of evidential predictability--the degree to which the initial belief 
predicts the evidence. An interpretation of this rule is considered in [47]. 
Like Dempster's rule, the bounds produced by this rule are too tight for 
the desired probabilistic interpretation. 
Neither (12) nor (14) produces the lower envelope bounds that we are 
interested in. However, by plugging (12) and (14) into (11), we obtain 
P(A I I ,E )P (E)  
_P(AIE) > P_(AII,E)P_(E) + P (~I*E)P (E) "  (15) 
This is defined when _P(E) > 0, and the bound is guaranteed to be tight 
when the original lower probability function is 2-monotone. In what 
follows, we will also handle the important case where P(E) > _P(E) = O. 
This rule is the basis for our new approach to conditioning. 
Although the lower probability bounds given by _P(AIE) and fi(AIE) do 
not possess the representational power to prevent a loss of information, 
the information contained jointly within _P(AI[, E) and P(AII*E), along 
with two scalar values, do possess adequate information. These are not the 
actual bounds--but hey indirectly encode all the information that is 
necessary to compute the desired bounds, using (15), for any proposition of 
interest. After observing E, we maintain four items: P(AI[, E), _P(AII*E), 
_P(E), and fi(E), the last two of which are simply scalars. 
A first observation to make is that both P(AI[, E) and fi(AII*E) can be 
computed incrementally, asthe following theorem demonstrates. 
THEOREM 1 Let_P and fi be lower and upper probability functions. For all 
sets A, E 1, E 2 ~ fl 
P (A  A E2II,E 1) 
P(AI I ,E  1 c3 E 2) = _P(E2ll,Ea ) , (16) 
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except hat _P(.[[, E 1 tq E 2) is undefined if P(E2l[ , E 1) = 0 or if P('ll, El) 
is undefined. Also, 
ff(A A E2II*E 1) 
fi(AII*E 1 n E 2) = P(E2II,E~) , (17) 
except hat P(.II* E1 A E 2) is undefined if f f (E 2 [l* E1 ) = 0 or P(.I[, E1 ) is 
undefined. 
Proof Saying _P(.[[, El) is undefined is equivalent o saying _P(E 1) = 0, 
and when this is the case, then from monotonicity, P(E 10 E2) = 0. If 
_P(E2II,E ~) = 0, then by (14), P (E  1 f-) E 2) = 0, so in either of these cases, 
_P('I[, E1 0 g2) is undefined. Otherwise, from the definition (14): 
P (A I I ,E  1 ¢3 E 2) =P(A  (3 E 1 n E2)/_P(E 1 (3 E 2) 
_P(A A E 10  E 2) /P (E  1 (~ E 2) 
_P(A A EI I I ,E 2) 
_P( EI I] , E2 ) 
The proof of (17) follows the same form. • 
A second observation to make is that _P(E) and i f(E) can also be 
computed incrementally when we maintain the four items of information 
mentioned previously. This follows directly from (14) and (12) as follows: 
P (E  1 N E 2) = _P(E2[[, E 1) • P(E1) , (18) 
P (E  1 n E 2) = P(E211*E1)./°(El). (19) 
The following theorem shows that the four items of information P(.[[, E), 
P(.II*E), _P(E), and P(E), which we now know can be updated incremen- 
tally, are sufficient for determining the lower (and upper) probability 
bounds. 
THEOREM 2 Let_P and ff be conjugate lower and upper probabilities. Then 
for A, E c I~, if _P(E) > O, 
P (A I I .E )P (E )  
_/'(ALE) _> P(A I I .E )P (E )  + P (~I*E)P (E)  (20) 
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or is undefined if fi(E) = O. If fi(E) >/ / (E)  = O, then for aliA c [~ 
10 if if(All*E) = 1, 
i f (AlE) > if //(All*E) < 1. (21) 
If~~ is 2-monotone, then the bounds are tight, so that 
_P( A[E) = 
/ / (A I I ,E ) / / (E)  
I f (A I I ,E) / / (E)  + P(AII*E)P(E) 
(22) 
if_P(E) > O, and 
i f (A lE)  = 
{~ if //(All*E) = 1, 
if //(All*E) < 1 
(23) 
/ fP(E)  >/ / (E )  = 0. 
Proof Consider if(E) > 0. Let P ~9( / / ) ;  then P_(A n E) < P(A n 
E) and P(A n E) < P(A n E). Therefore, 
P(AIE)  >_ 
_P(A A E) 
_P(A A E) + P(A  (~ E) ' 
and therefore//(ALE) > the same. The first part then follows from (14) 
and (12) by plugging in _P(A n E )= _P(AI[,E)If(E) and P(A n E)= 
P(AII*E)P(E). 
In the case where f i (E )> i f (E )= 0, if i f(Al l*E)< 1 the bound is 
trivially true. If if(All*E) = 1 then P(AII*E) = 0 = P(A C~ E)/P(E) ,  so 
P(A n E) = 0 and P(~E)  = 0 for any P ~( i f ( ' lE ) ) ,  so P(AIE) = 1. 
Suppose if is 2-monotone. Note that (A n E) n (An  E) = •; there- 
fore these exists a P ~(_P)  such that P(A hE)=i f (A  hE)  and 
P(A n E )= P(A c3 E). Then (20) reduces to equality, as does (21) 
when//(All*E) < 1. When//(Al l*E) = 1, the tightness of (21) is trivially 
true. • 
The rule in (20) reduces to (11) for one-step conditioning, but as we 
discussed, (11) loses information and is thus problematic with incremental 
updates. The case when P(E) > if(E) = 0 was not considered by others 
such as [15] who have discussed (11), despite the fact that pragmatically it 
is important o know what to do in that case, since it may in fact occur. 
Finally, it should be noted that when if is a probability distribution (and 
therefore also 2-monotone), the theorem reduces to the well-known Bayes 
rule in probability theory. 
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It is also interesting to note from (23) that once an item of evidence is 
obtained such that _P(E) = 0, Dempster's rule contains, from that point 
on, all the information eeded to compute the conditional lower probabil- 
ity. 
5. MOBIUS TRANSFORM m(' l I ,E)  AND m('ll*E) 
In this section we identify the M6bius transforms of P('I I ,E) and 
fi('ll*E). We show that conditioning for these can be done directly in 
M6bius space, which is very convenient when the functions themselves are 
represented in the computer by their M6bius transforms. Although we do 
not use it here, [24] has previously shown how to compute _P('FE) as given 
in (11) directly in M6bius space. 
THEOREM i (Dubois and Prade [13]) Let_P be a lower probability, m its 
M6bius transform, and A, E ~ II. Let P_(AI[, E) be defined by (14). Then 
the Mfbius transform of_P(.II, E) is given by 
m(A)  
m(AI I ,E)  = ~ if A c E. (24) 
0 otherwise. 
THEOREM 2 (Sharer [40]) Let fi be an upper probability function, m its 
M6bius transform, and A, E ~ D. Let fi(AII*E) be defined by (12). Then 
the Mgbius transform of _P('ll* E) is given by 
1 
~., m(B).  (25) 
m(AI[*E) f i(E) B:BnE=A 
Theorem 2 is known as Dempster's rule of conditioning. It is a 
well-known theorem (at least for the special case of belief functions) and 
is heavily used in the contexts of Dempster-Shafer theory [40] and the 
transferable-belief model [50]. 
The previous ection showed that _P can be updated incrementally, as
can P. It therefore follows that the MiSbius transforms can also be 
updated incrementally as follows [provided they are defined, i.e., that 
_P(E 1 n E 2) > 0 or P(E 1 ~ E 2) > 0 respectively]: 
{ m(AII,E1) 
re(All,E1 hE2)  = _p(E21I,E1 ) if A ___g 2, (26) 
0 otherwise, 
1 
Y'. m(BIl*E~). (27) m(AII*E 1 N E 2) = fi(E2II,E1) B~Ez=A 
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Implementing the update rules for m(.hI,E) and m('ll*E) is quite 
easy. When a new item of evidence E is obtained, m('ll, E) is obtained 
by throwing away any sets that are not totally contained within E and 
then normalizing the remaining M6bius assignments. Similarly, m('ll*E) 
is computed by throwing away any M/Sbius assignments are not compati- 
ble with E, intersecting the rest with E, and then normalizing. Comput- 
ing _P(E) with i f (E)  each require a summation over focal elements as 
given by (3) and (4). 
6. EXAMPLE 
This section demonstrates the use of the new representation using the 
example from Sections 2.1 and 3. The knowledge at any moment (after 
learning E) is represented by the following four items: (m , ,  m*, p , ,  p* ), 
where m,  = m(' l l ,E) ,  m* = m('ll*E), p ,  = _P(E), and p* = fi(E). Ini- 
tially, we can take E = fl, so that the initial knowledge is represented by 
(m o, m o, 1, 1), where m 0 is given in (5). 
Suppose it is first learned that the true situation is in E 2 = {mammal, 
bird, reptile}. We compute p i • = -PI(E1) = _P0(Ell[ * ~'~)-P(~Q) by using (18), 
where _P0(EllL,f~) is obtained from m 0 using (3). In this example, this 
yields P l ,  = 0.04. Similarly, we use (19) and (4) to compute py = i l (E  1) 
= 0.5. Finally, we use (26) and (27) to compute ml ,  = m(. l l ,E 1) and 
my = m(.l[*E 1) respectively. Our belief is now given by the four items 
(m s , ,  my, 0.04, 0.5), where 
m I , ({mammal}) = 0.75, m T ({mammal}) -- 0.06, 
mT ({reptile}) = 0.92, 
m~,({bird, reptile})= 0.25, mT({bird, reptile})= 0.02. 
Next, suppose it is learned that the true situation is in E z = {mammal, 
bird, fish}. Precisely the same process is used, starting with 
(m I , ,  m*, Pl , ,  P* )- First, P2 • = PI(E2II* El) "Pl • = 0.75 × 0.04 = 0.03. 
Similarly, p~ = PI(EzII*E 1) -py = 0.08 x 0.5 = 0.04. The new updated be- 
lief is given by (m 2 , ,  m~, 0.03, 0.04), where 
m 2 , ({mammal}) = 1, m~ ({mammal}) = 0.75, 
m~ ({bird}) = 0.25. 
Precisely the same result is obtained by conditioning the initial belief 
(m0, m0, 1, 1) with E 1 A E e = {mammal, bird}, or by performing the up- 
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dates in the opposite order. With this representation, we can now compute 
bounds for any proposition of interest. For example, for the set {mammal}, 
using (22), 
P_({mammal}lE~ n E2) = 
1 × 0.03 
1 × 0.03 + 0.25 × 0.04 
= 0.75. 
7. SPARSITY 
Even if one were willing to ignore the loss of information from a straight 
lower-probability representation, there would still be a complexity prob- 
lem. Consider a lower-probability function whose M6bius transform has k 
focal elements. After updating using 
_P(A N E)  
_P(AIE) = _P(A ~ E)  + P (A  ¢~ E) '  (28) 
the number of focal elements in the updated function may grow exponen- 
tially to O(2 k) focal elements. On the other hand, the number of focal 
elements in the modified representation from the previous two sections 
actually never increases at all with new evidence. This may seem surpris- 
ing, since the modified representation captures more information than the 
straight representation, yet requires far fewer parameters to do so. 
Ideally, the complexity of lower-probabilistic nference should depend 
primarily on the number of constraints defining the function rather than 
on the size of the domain. In this way, we hope to take advantage of 
sparsity--in our case where the number of focal elements is small com- 
pared to 2 Ix~l. 
The following example will demonstrate hat an update with the straight 
lower-probabilistic representation given by (28) can increase the number of 
focal elements exponentially. Recall that (28) produces tight bounds when 
P is 2-monotone. 
Suppose _P has k focal elements denoted by the sets d = {A,, A 2 . . . . .  
At}, such that any Boolean combination of these sets is nonempty. An 
alternative way of stating this is to consider a surjective 4 mapping X : f~ 
{0, 1, 2 . . . . .  2 k - 1}, and take A, to be all elements oJ ~ fl where the 
first bit is set when the results of X(w) is written in binary, A 2 are those 
elements with the second bit set, and so on. Clearly we are considering a
domain where {111 > 2 k. For this example we can also assume that _P is a 
4A surjective mapping is a function with the property that for any value in the range of the 
function, there is an input that maps to that value. 
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belief function and that the M6bius-transform assignment for focal ele- 
ment i = 1 . . . . .  k is m(A i) = 2 i- 1/(2k -- 1). This m(.) has the property 
that the sum of M/Sbius assignments for each subset of s¢ is unique. 
Let E = A~ u A e u ... u Ak/2.  For simplicity, assume k is even. We 
will now count some of the focal elements in _P(.IE)--it is not necessary to 
count all of them, because we can stop counting once we've accounted for 
an exponential number of them. As exact formula for obtaining the 
complete set of focal elements appears in [24, Section V]. 
When A _c f~, let 
Ice(A) -= {A i Ed :  A i cA  ('1 E}, 
UCE(A) = {A i ~¢:  A i ~ A U ff~}. 
We can think of these as the lower and upper core of A in the expression 
_P(A n E) 
_P(AIE) = 
P_(A (3 E)  + P (A  (1 E)  " 
In particular, Ice(A) and ucE(A) are the focal elements involved in the 
computation of _P(A n E) and P(A  n E )  respectively. 
Suppose A cA  1, A :~ A 1. Then A is not a focal element of _P('IE), 
because _P(A C~ E) = _P(A) is zero for all such sets. However, A = A 1 will 
be a focal element, lCE(A 1) = {A1}, UCE(A 1) ---- {A2,.. .  Ak}, and 
_P(A 1 A E)  
m( Z l ]E  ) =_P(AI IE) = 
P(A, n E) + P(X 1 n E) 
m(A 1) 
m(A  1) + F_,k=2m(Ai) "
Next, consider supersets of A 1 that are not supersets of any of A2,  
A 2 . . . . .  A k. The numerator in (28) for these sets will again be m(A1), but 
the second term of the denominator may change depending on the set. In 
fact, we can identify the sets on which the second term of the denominator 
changes, which must therefore correspond to the addition of a focal 
element in the updated belief. Suppose, for example, that B contains A 1 
and is only one element short of being equal to A 1 N A i. Note that A 1 is 
in fact the only focal element contained by B. Then it also follows that 
Ice(B) = IcE(A 1) = {A 1} and uce(B) = UCE(A  1) = {A2, . . .  , Ak}. But 
UCE(A  1 fqA k) = {A 2 . . . . .  Zk_l},  SO that the computation of _P(A~ n 
Ak lE )  involves a different upper core than the computation of _P(BIE), a 
set that is only one element smaller. It must therefore be the case that 
A~ c~ A k c~ E is a focal element in the updated function. 
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The same argument could have also been made for any of the sets 
A1 nAk/2+1, A~ AAk/2+2 .... ,A1 •Ak 1, to identify a corresponding 
new focal element in the updated function. Furthermore, for each of these 
sets, the entire argument can be repeated further, using their supersets to 
obtain additional focal elements. The result is as follows. Let I _c J = {k/2 
+ 1, k /2+2, . . . , k} ;  then the set A~ u U i~ IA iAE  will be a focal 
element, with the lower probability given by 
) m(A1) 
_P A~U [ , . JA iAEE = 
i~i m(AI) + EA~ucE(A) m(A) 
m(A1) 
I,/2 ~: 1m(Ai) ]m(A 1) + [Y'.i=2m(Ai ) 4- E i 
For each of the subsets of I, the upper core uce(A ~ u I.J i~ IAi  ) is unique, 
and due to the previous choice of initial mass assignment, his implies that 
the updated lower probability is unique, and therefore there must be a 
nonzero mass assignment to account for the difference. 
Thus far we have identified a fraction of the sets that will be focal 
elements in _P(.IE). We have identified one focal element for each subset 
I c_ {k/2 + 1, k/2 + 2,...,k}, making a total of 2 k/2. Therefore, the 
number of focal elements in _P(.IE) is O(2k). 
This example shows that the straight lower-probability representation 
cannot, at least in the worst care, take advantage of sparsity (where the 
number of focal elements is much smaller than I~l). 
Next, consider the number of focal elements in the modified representa- 
tion introduced in Sections 4 and 5. Recall from (24) that _P(.H.E) is 
computed by deleting all focal elements of _P(-) except those contained 
within E, and then normalizing. Similarly, from (25), _P('It*E) is computed 
by deleting all focal elements from _P(.) except those that intersect E, 
intersecting the remaining ones with E and normalizing. Therefore, any 
focal element of _P('II.E) is also a focal element of _P('II*E). Thus, we 
need only count the focal elements of _P(-II*E). If _P(-) has k focal 
elements, then _P(.[[*E) is guaranteed to have less than k focal elements. 
We see, therefore, that the number of focal elements in the new represen- 
tation can only decrease as additional evidence is incorporated. 
It is surprising that the straight lower-probability representation is at the 
same time less informative and exponentially larger than our modified 
representation, but this is in fact what has just been shown. As a result, the 
modified representation is much more convenient to implement and use 
when reasoning about lower probabilities. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Lower probability has been used in the existing literature in many 
different contexts and for many different reasons and purposes. It has 
often been suggested that these representations can be updated via condi- 
tioning in the same way as with exact probabilities by making use of 
interval arithmetic. However, it has been shown in this paper that there 
are number of difficulties with doing so. Each update on such a represen- 
tation loses information. The loss is not due to any particular conditioning 
rule, but occurs from a lack of representational power in the lower 
probability representation. With such a representation, the results of 
inference depend on the order in which evidence is incorporated, and on 
whether evidence is incorporated incrementally or all at once. 
Computational considerations also present problems for the straight 
lower-probability representation. It is not convenient to update the M/Sbius 
transforms of lower-probability functions directly, and these representa- 
tions cannot take advantage of sparsity (the case where the number of 
M6bius assignments defining the functions is small compared to the size of 
the domain). In fact, it was shown that the number of focal elements in a 
straight lower-probability representation can increase exponentially when 
evidence is incorporated. 
To rectify these problems, an alternative representation for lower proba- 
bility was introduced. Rather than store the lower-probability function 
directly, the new representation is composed of four different items, from 
which the lower probability of any set can be computed. Interestingly, one 
of these items is the function computed from Dempster's rule of condition- 
ing, highlighting a new relationship between evidential reasoning and 
lower probability--namely, that Dempster's rule contains some, but not 
all, of the information eeded to track lower probability. 
In contrast with the straight lower-probability representation, it is very 
convenient to directly update the M/Sbius transform of the new representa- 
tion. The new representation does not experience the exponential growth 
with updates een with the straight lower-probability representation--in 
fact, the number of constraints (focal elements) actually gets smaller as 
more evidence is obtained. Furthermore, the new representation does not 
lose any information that is relevant for computing probability bounds. 
The same bounds are obtained regardless of the order in which evidence is 
incorporated, and regardless of whether updates are done incrementally or 
all at once. 
The benefits of the new representation may be helpful to anyone 
wishing to compute lower and upper probabilities. There are a number of 
areas for future research. We have only considered one form of probabilis- 
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tic inference in this document: conditioning. Other forms, for example 
Jeffrey's rule, are possible [7], and we are currently experimenting with the 
use of similar rules on the new representation. It would also be interesting 
to further extend the connection between Dempster-Shafer theory and 
lower probabilities. In particular, since Dempster's rule of conditioning is 
actually a special case of Dempster's rule of combination, it would be 
interesting if a generalized rule of combination on the new representation 
could identified, and it would be interesting to examine if such a rule could 
enable a theory of statistical evidence in the spirit of [40, Chapter 9]. 
Finally, it would be very useful if methods for modularizing the new 
representation were developed, for example, in the spirit of [43], [45], and 
[3], and to develop local propagation methods as has been done for convex 
sets of probabilities in [4]. Such modularizations would be very significant, 
especially since they do not appear easy to come by. 
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